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Linear Quadratic Games with Costly
Measurements∗
Dipankar Maity†, Achilleas Anastasopoulos‡, and John S. Baras†
Abstract
In this work we consider a stochastic linear quadratic two-player game. The state
measurements are observed through a switched noiseless communication link. Each
player incurs a finite cost every time the link is established to get measurements.
Along with the usual control action, each player is equipped with a switching action
to control the communication link. The measurements help to improve the estimate
and hence reduce the quadratic cost but at the same time the cost is increased due to
switching. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium control and switching strategies
for the players. We show that the problem can be solved in a two-step process by
solving two dynamic programming problems. The first step corresponds to solving
a dynamic programming for the control strategy and the second step solves another
dynamic programming for the switching strategy.
1 Introduction
Linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic games have attracted a great deal of attention in the control
and related community due to its wide applicability in stochastic control, minimax control,
multi-agent systems and economics [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. There is a well established
notion of (Nash) equilibrium (NE) strategies for static games, and in dynamic games there
are refinements of NE known as subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). Closed form solutions for
these NE (or SPE) may generally not exist or hard to compute if one such exists. Among
the various classes of dynamic games, LQ games exhibit a closed form expression for SPE,
and it is characterized by some Riccati equations. Necessary and sufficient conditions for
the NE strategies of LQ games have been studied in [4], [9], [6]. Contrary to the prior
belief, [10] shows existence of nonlinear control strategies for LQ games.
Amongst the vast majority of the prior works, the underlying assumption is the avail-
ability of free observations. Dynamic games are studied with either open-loop strategy (i.e.
only measurement is the initial state) or feedback strategies where the observation is avail-
able freely at any time. Challenges emerge when the measurements are on demand, but
costly. This adds an extra layer of decision making, for the players, because now they have
to both, control the system and ask for measurements.
∗This article is an unabridged version of [1].
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Figure 1: Schematic of the system. Each player has to select their controller strategy gi and
switching strategy si. All the links are noiseless and delay-free.
In this work, we consider a class of two-player linear quadratic stochastic games of finite
horizon. The game dynamics are partially observable. Contrary to the existing literature,
the observations are not freely available. Each observation requires a finite cost for establish-
ing a link for communication. The link through which the observations are communicated
to the players (their controllers) is noiseless but operated by two switches (Figure 1), one for
each player. The link is established only when both the players are willing for it, and they
both get the actual state measurement at that time. Consequently, there is an apparent
trade off between cost of obtaining state measurement and the estimation quality.
In this game, the players can make a precise estimate of the state if they establish
the link at every time instance. However, since the link establishment is costly, they can
compromise the estimation accuracy in exchange of the cost for accessing the measurement.
Therefore, the problem is to optimally decide when to establish the link and how to use
the acquired measurement in order to minimize their individual cost. Since, in general, the
players will have different preferences over the time instances when they want to acquire
the measurement, they have to come to an agreement when to actually establish the link.
The closest work on the similar game framework has been studied in [11] where the au-
thors studied zero-sum stochastic differential LQ games. However, the selection for switching
times were performed in an collaborative way rather than being the outcome of a strategic
interaction. The major digression of this work from [11] is that we consider an explicit game
for the switching strategy as well. We express the switch as a Boolean control action and
seek for SPE for both control and switching strategies.
Our contributions are as follows:
(a) We study the SPE of this dynamic game and show that they can be found through a
two-step process. Specifically, in the first step we fix the switching strategy and study the
SPE for control strategies. The study shows that the control strategy is linear in estimated
state, where the gain is characterized with two backward Riccati equations which can be
computed offline. Moreover, the Riccati equations do not depend on the switching strategy.
(b) Regarding the equilibrium switching strategy, we provide a backward recursive algorithm
to find all SPE where value functions need only be computed over a finite and quadratically-
sized (in the duration of the game) set.
(c) Regarding the equilibrium switching strategy, we show that there are many equilibria
among which there is one that is strictly preferable by both users and has a Markovian
structure. It is found in our study that a strictly preferable switching strategy for a player not
only depends on their own cost-to-go, but also depends on the cost-to-go for the opponent.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: The problem formulation is provided
in Section 2, Section 3 contains the results on the SPE of the control strategy, SPE for
the switching strategy and its offline computation are analyzed in Section 4. Finally we
conclude our work in Section 6.
2 Problem Formulation
In the discrete time Gauss-Markov setting, we consider the following linear dynamics of the
state Xt:
Xt+1 = AXt +B
1U1t +B
2U2t +Wt (1)
where Xt ∈ X = Rn, and U it ∈ U i = Rm denotes the action of player i. Wt ∈ Rn is a
Gaussian noise with E[Wt] = 0 and E[WtW
′
s] = Sδt−s (δt is the Kronecker delta.), and
X0 ∼ N (0,Σ0).
There are two additional actions (switching actions) V 1t ∈ {0, 1} and V 2t ∈ {0, 1}. These
switching actions control a switch (switch closes if both are equal to 1) and the observation
available to both users is Yt ∈ X ∪ {e} with
Yt =
{
Xt , V
1
t = V
2
t = 1
e , else,
(2)
where “e” denotes an erasure. The evolution of random variables in period t is assumed to
be ...Xt → (V 1t , V 2t )→ Yt → (U1t , U2t )...
The information available at time t to player i before she takes the switching action V it
is
It = (Y
t−1, U1,t−1, U2,t−1, V 1,t−1, V 2,t−1), (3)
and the information available at time t to player i before she takes the control action U it is
I¯t = (It, V
1
t , V
2
t , Yt). (4)
As a result, the actions have the functional form
V it = s
i
t(It), i = 1, 2, (5a)
U it = g
i
t(I¯t), i = 1, 2, (5b)
where by gi = (git)
T−1
t=0 , s
i = (sit)
T−1
t=0 , we denote the control and switching strategies of
player i. ∀t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1}, let us denote an It measurable random variable ∆t = V 1t ·V 2t .
The individual cost that each player needs to minimize is quadratic in state and action,
and it also depends on the switching actions V 1t and V
2
t . We consider a game for a finite
duration ({0, · · · , T}) and the per-stage costs are explicitly written as:
Cit(xt, u
1
t , u
2
t , v
1
t , v
2
t ) =‖xt‖2Qi + ‖uit‖2Qii + ‖ujt‖2Qij + λi(vit · vjt ) (6)
for all t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1} and
CiT (xt, u
1
t , u
2
t , v
1
t , v
2
t ) = ‖xT ‖2Qi . (7)
The quantity λi > 0 is the cost paid by player i when both the players attempt to close the
switch and they observe the state information Xt. Therefore the average cost over the time
horizon {0, · · · , T} is represented as,
J i(σ1, σ2) =
T∑
t=0
E[Cit(Xt, U1t , U2t , V 1t , V 2t )] (8)
where σi = (gi, si) denotes the strategy of the player i that corresponds to control strategy
gi and switching strategy si.
The objective of player i is:
min
σi
J i(σ1, σ2) = min
si
{min
gi
J i(σ1, σ2)} (9)
3 Subgame Perfect Control Strategy
For dynamic games with complete information the appropriate equilibrium concept is a re-
finement of Nash equilibrium (NE) called the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). A strategy
profile (σ1, σ2) is a SPE if the restriction of (σ1, σ2) to any proper subgame of the original
game constitutes a NE [12, pp. 94].
We seek to characterize the SPE (σ1∗, σ2∗) for this switched LQG game. Moreover, we
will show that among the multiple SPE, there exists one that simultaneously minimizes the
cost for both users among all SPE and thus it will be the preferable SPE solution of this
game. In this section, we study the SPE control strategy for both the players.
Theorem 3.1 For any switching profile (s1, s2) of the players, the SPE control strategy gi∗
has the following structure:
U it = g
i∗
t (I¯t) = −LitXˆt, (10)
where
Xˆt =
{
AXˆt−1 +B1U1t−1 +B
2U2t−1, V
1
t · V 2t = 0
Xt, V
1
t · V 2t = 1.
(11)
Furthermore, the cost-to-go incurred by player i under the SPE control strategy at any
time step k is given by,
Ji∗k (I¯k) = E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + λi∆t) +
T−2∑
t=k
∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + ‖ET ‖
2
Qi | I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik
(12)
where Et = Xt − Xˆt. The matrices Lit and P it depend only on the game parameters
A,Bi, Qi, Qii and Qij (detailed expressions are in the proof of the theorem) and thus, can
be calculated offline without the knowledge of the switching strategy profile.
proof The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix 7.1.
To maintain brevity Ji∗k (I¯k) will be denoted as Ji∗k . From this point onward we will set
∆T = 0 and write (12) in compact form as
Ji∗k (I¯k) = E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + ∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖
2
Qi | I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik (13)
It should be noted that in Theorem 3.1, the gi∗ depends on the given switching strategy
(s1, s2) through the Xˆt.
There are several remarks to be made at this point.
The stochastic control version of the same problem (i.e. single player single objective) is
a modified Kalman filtering problem where the observations are available on demand after
paying certain cost λ per observation. Therefore, the decision of switching will solely depend
on the influence of switching on the error covariance matrix. This is a side result of our
work and details will appear elsewhere.
From Theorem 3.1, minσi J
i(σ1, σ2) = minsi E[Ji∗0 ]. Therefore, the total cost incurred
by player i with control strategy profile (g1∗, g2∗) is E[Ji∗0 ]. Hence, the total cost incurred
with the switching is:
E[Ji∗0 ] = E[‖Xˆ0‖2P i0 ] + E
[ T−1∑
t=0
(‖Et‖2Qi + ∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + λi∆t)+ ‖ET ‖2Q1]. (14)
Another remark that is apparent from our result is that the SPE control strategy is
completely characterized by the pair of matrices (P 1t , P
2
t ) which is uniquely determined by
backward dynamic equations.
4 Subgame Perfect Switching Strategy
In this section we complete the procedure for finding the SPE of this game by focusing on
the switching strategies. We will do that by considering the backward induction process
for finding SPE and reduce the cost-to-go functions into a simpler and more tractable form
(compared to the one in (13)).
In this problem the switching action is taken first at time k based on the knowledge
Ik and then the augmented knowledge I¯k = (Ik, V
1
k , V
2
k , Yk) is used to select the control
strategies U ik. In order to visualize it, one might break the time period [k, k + 1] into two
halves where in the first half, switching action is performed and in the second half, control
action is performed. In Theorem 3.1, Ji∗k is the optimal cost-to-go after the switching decision
has been taken at time k.
The actual (before switching action is taken) cost-to-go at stage k is:
Vik(Ik) = E
[ T∑
t=k
Cit(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t , V
1
t , V
2
t )| Ik
]
(15)
and the optimization (game) variables are control U it and switching V
i
t for all t ≥ k.
Due to the fact I¯t ⊇ It for all t, we can write
Vik(Ik) =E
[
E
[ T∑
t=k
Cit(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t , V
1
t , V
2
t )| I¯k
]
Ik
]
(16)
=E
[
Jik(g1, g2)| Ik
]
where Jik(g1, g2) = E
[∑T
t=k C
i
t(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t , V
1
t , V
2
t )| I¯k
]
.
Since each player is interested in minimizing their cost, they are interested in minsi,gi Vik(Ik)
at every stage k (finally they want to minimize Vi0(I0)).
We can write,
min
si,gi
Vik(Ik) = min
si
{min
gi
Vik(Ik)} = min
si
E[Ji∗k | Ik]. (17)
We substitute the expression of Ji∗k from Theorem 3.1 into (17), but before that, let us
define,
Mt = E[EtE′t| I¯t] = (1−∆t)(AMt−1A′ + S) (18)
where AM−1A′ + S = Σ0 (since X0 ∼ N (0,Σ0)).
We also define Mt|t−1 = AMt−1A′ + S. Note that Mt|t−1 is It measurable whereas Mt
is I¯t measurable. Mt and Mt|t−1 are related as follows:
Mt = (1−∆t)Mt|t−1 (19)
Now let us consider the k-th stage cost Ji∗k .
Ji∗k =E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + ∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + λi∆t)+ ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯k]+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik
=E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(
tr(QiMt + ∆t+1(AMtA
′ + S)P it+1) + λi∆t
)
+ tr(QiMT )| I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik
=E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(
tr((1−∆t)QiMt|t−1 + ∆t+1Mt+1|tP it+1) + λi∆t
)
+ tr(QiMT )| I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik (20)
Let us define Vik(Ik) = E
[
Ji∗k | Ik
]
Therefore,
Vik(Ik) =E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(
tr((1−∆t)QiMt|t−1) + tr(∆t+1Mt+1|tP it+1) + λi∆t
)
+ tr(QiMT )| Ik
]
+ E
[
‖Xˆk‖2P ik | Ik
]
(21)
Using (47), we get
Vik(Ik) = E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(
tr((1−∆t)QiMt|t−1) + tr(∆tMt|t−1P it ) + λi∆t
)
+ tr(QiMT )| Ik
]
+ ‖Xˆk|k−1‖2P ik (22)
The selection of switching strategy sik(Ik) has no effect of Xˆk|k−1 and hence it does not
play any role in the game at stage k.
Let us define an instantaneous cost:
C¯it(Mt|t−1,∆t) =(1−∆t)tr(QiMt|t−1) + ∆ttr(Mt|t−1P it ) + λi∆t. (23)
With slight abuse of notation, after neglecting the Xˆk|k−1 term, we obtain,
Vik(Ik) = E
[ T∑
t=k
C¯it(Mt|t−1,∆t)| Ik
]
. (24)
Therefore,
min
si,gi
Vik(Ik) = min
si
Vik(Ik)
= min
si
E
[ T∑
t=k
C¯it(Mt|t−1,∆t)| Ik
]
. (25)
Let us denote:
Vi∗k = min
si
Vik(Ik). (26)
Let us perform the similar backward induction to find the SPE for the switching strate-
gies. Note at time T , there is no action to optimize and
ViT (IT ) = E
[
C¯iT (MT |T−1,∆T )| IT
]
= E
[
tr(QiMT ) | IT
]
. (27)
Let us define
Vi∗T = ViT (IT ) = E
[
tr(QiMT ) | IT
]
. (28)
Similarly, at T − 1,
ViT−1(IT−1) = E
[
C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2,∆T−1) + C¯
i
T (MT , 0)| IT−1
]
. (29)
ViT−1(IT−1) = E
[
C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2,∆T−1) + tr(Q
iMT )| IT−1
]
. (30)
Using MT−1 = (1−∆T−1)MT−1|T−2 and MT = AMT−1A′ + S,
ViT−1(IT−1) =E
[
C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2,∆T−1)+
(1−∆T−1)tr(Qi(AMT−1|T−2A′)) + tr(QiS)| IT−1
]
(31)
If (s1∗T−1, s
2∗
T−1) is a SPE strategy at time T − 1 then
ViT−1(IT−1)
∣∣
(si∗T−1,s
j∗
T−1)
≤ ViT−1(IT−1)
∣∣
(siT−1,s
j∗
T−1)
(32)
∀siT−1 and for both i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Using the above definition of SPE, siT−1(IT−1) = 0 for i = 1, 2 is an equilibrium strategy
since unilateral change from 0 to 1 does not change the cost for any player. However, there
might be other equilibria (in this case only (1, 1)) which produces lower cost for the above
cost function.
It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium strategy at T − 1 is
si∗T−1(IT−1) =
{
1 if C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 1)− C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 0) ≤ tr(Qi(AMT−1|T−2A′))
0 otherwise
(33)
From (33) we notice that (1, 0) and (0, 1) can also be an equilibrium strategy. However
those equilibria are equivalent to (0, 0) in the sense that they produce the same cost-to-go
Vi∗T−1 for both i = 1, 2. Therefore, we will restrict our attention on two equilibria (0, 0) and
(1, 1)
As a remark, it is pointed out that adding an infinitesimal switching cost i for every
time player i requests for a switching (irrespective of whether the switch was closed or not)
will ensure that (0, 1) and (1, 0) is never an SPE.
Let us note when C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 1) − C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 0) = tr(Qi(AMT−1|T−2A′)),
then si∗T−1 = 0 or 1, both produces the same cost-to-go value. Under such situations, all
possible switching actions are equivalent. In order to obliterate such instances we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 4.1 If C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 1) − C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 0) = tr(Qi(AMT−1|T−2A′)),
si∗(IT−1) = 0 for all possible history IT−1. Then, (33) is modified as follows:
si∗T−1(IT−1) =
{
1 if C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 1)− C¯iT−1(MT−1|T−2, 0) < tr(Qi(AMT−1|T−2A′))
0 otherwise
(34)
Irrespective of whether SPE siT−1(IT−1) is 0 or 1, the optimal cost-to-go Vi∗T−1 depends
only on MT−2 and also the best SPE strategy (that produces the least cost among all SPE)
si∗T−1(IT−1) depends only on MT−2 (or MT−1|T−2).
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Claim 4.2 For any k, there exists a si∗k (Ik) that depends only on Mk−1 and produces the
least cost-to-go among all SPE. Hence Vi∗k ≡ Vi∗k (Mk−1) (i.e. Vi∗k only depends on Mk−1).
Proof: The hypothesis is true for k = T, T−1. Let us assume it is true for some k+1 ≤ T ,
i.e. Vi∗k+1 ≡ Vi∗k+1(Mk). Therefore,
Vi∗k = min
si
T∑
t=k
E
[
C¯it(Mt|t−1,∆t)| Ik
]
Then using a dynamic programming argument,
Vi∗k = min
sik
E
[
C¯ik(Mk|k−1,∆k) + Vi∗k+1(Mk)| Ik
]
= min
sik
E
[
C¯ik(Mk|k−1,∆k) + Vi∗k+1
(
(1−∆k)Mk|k−1
)| Ik] (35)
From (35), the best equilibrium strategy si∗k (Ik) = 1 if
C¯ik(Mk|k−1, 1) + Vi∗k+1(0) < C¯ik(Mk|k−1, 0) + Vi∗k+1(Mk|k−1)
(similar to assumption 4.1, we only consider the strict inequality), otherwise sik(Ik) = 0.
Therefore si∗k (Ik) requires only the knowledge of Mk−1 and hence from (35), Vik(Ik) ≡
Vi∗k (Mk−1)
For this class of games, there always exists a Markovian SPE switching strategy and a
Markovian SPE control strategy which produce the least cost-to-go among all SPE. Though,
there might be other non-Markovian SPE strategies which produce the same cost, however,
due to the claim 4.2, it is sufficient to consider only the Markovian strategies to find the
best SPE corresponding to the least cost-to-go.
4.1 Offline Calculation of V i∗k (Mk−1)
In the following we define how the players can take the decision online by using some stored
offline functions (value functions).
Let us define Vi∗k (M) in the following manner:
Vi∗T (M) = C¯iT (M, 0). ∀M and i = 1, 2 (36)
and
Vi∗k (M) =
{
C¯ik(M, 1) + Vi∗k+1(0) if ϑ(k,M) > 1,
C¯ik(M, 0) + Vi∗k+1(AMA′ + S) otherwise.
(37)
where ϑ(k,M) = min{ϑ1(k,M), ϑ2(k,M)}, and
ϑi(k,M) =
C¯ik(M, 0) + Vi∗k+1(AMA′ + S)
C¯ik(M, 1) + Vi∗k+1(0)
(38)
By construction, if Vi∗k+1(·) denotes the minimum cost-to-go (for the subgame starting
at k + 1) among the SPE, Vi∗k (·) defined in (37) provides the minimum cost-to-go at stage
k for player i. Therefore, by backward inductions, Vi∗· (·) denotes the cost-to-go function
along an SPE that simultaneously minimizes the cost-to-go for both players.
Claim 4.3 For any k,M and history Ik, the best switching strategy (SPE) is given by
si∗k (Ik) = 1 for i = 1, 2 if and only if,
C¯ik(M, 1) + Vi∗k+1(0) < C¯ik(M, 0) + Vi∗k+1(AMA′ + S). (39)
Otherwise si∗k (Ik) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
proof ⇒ is trivially true.
⇐: First, notice that we have established sik(Ik) = 0 is an SPE strategy for all k, Ik.
Now let us assume that at some k,M , (39) holds, then if player i selects a strategy such
that sik(Ik) = 0, then the cost-to-go for player i with any strategy profile ((s
1)Tk+1, (s
2)Tk+1)
from time k + 1 onward is
C¯ik(M, 0) + Vik+1(AMA′ + S, (s1)Tk+1, (s2)Tk+1)
≥ C¯ik(M, 0) + Vi∗k+1(AMA′ + S)
> C¯ik(M, 1) + Vi∗k+1(0) (40)
Therefore, unilateral deviation is harmful (strictly non-profitable) for the player i, and
that allows us to conclude sik(Ik) = 1 for i = 1, 2 is an equilibrium for (k,M). Therefore
(s1k(Ik), s
2
k(Ik)) = (0, 0) and (1, 1) both are equilibria. However, the cost-to-go by selecting
(1, 1) is strictly lesser than selecting (0, 0), and this is, therefore, preferable by the players.
Note that, (37) can be calculated and stored offline and (39) can be evaluated online
using the stored values.
Equation (39) is equivalent to:
λi <Vi∗k+1(AMA′ + S)− Vi∗k+1(0)− tr
(
(P ik −Qi)(AMA′ + S)
)
(41)
which shows a threshold policy for SPE switching.
We note that M0|−1 = Σ0, therefore at time 0 we only need the value Vi∗0 (Σ0) not the
function Vi∗0 (·) in the entire space of symmetric positive semidefinite matrices. In order
to decide (s1∗0 (I0), s
2∗
0 (I0)) we need to know only four values Vi∗1 (0),Vi∗1 (AΣ0A′ + S) for
i = 1, 2. Therefore, given the variance of X0, we need to store only finite number of values
to characterize all the value functions for a finite duration game.
Claim 4.4 The maximum number of values (value function evaluations) needed to be stored
to calculate the switching strategies for entire game of duration [0, T ] is T (T + 3).
proof Let at stage k, Mk|k−1 (or Mk−1) takes nk number of possible distinct values based
on all possible previous history Ik. Therefore to determine the switching at time k, we need
to make nk comparison tests (39) and for each test the Vi∗k+1(0) term is common. Therefore
we need to evaluate the value function only at nk + 1 number of points at time k.
For the switching pair (1, 1), Mk = 0 (or Mk+1|k = S) and for any other possible
switching profile at stage k, Mk = Mk|k−1. Therefore at stage k + 1, nk+1 will be at most
nk + 1 ( and nk+1 possible values of Mk.) Therefore,
nk+1 ≤ nk + 1 (42)
with n0 = 1, we get nk ≤ k + 1.
Total value function evaluations to be stored =
2 ∗
T−1∑
k=0
(nk + 1) ≤ T (T + 3).
The factor 2 in above equation is due to the fact that we have to evaluate the value functions
for both the players.
Remark 4.5 A switching is performed only when it strictly reduces the cost-to-go for both
users. Therefore, each switching minimizes the welfare cost-to-go. However, the converse
is not necessarily true i.e. a switching with a potential to reduce the welfare cost-to-go may
not always be performed.
4.2 Centralized Optimization vs. Game Setup
The problem we consider here is a game theoretic setup between two players with their
own optimization criterion with two actions (control and switch). While they can select
their controllers independently, however, their individual switching action does not affect
the system (and cost) unless they switch synchronously. A valid question to ask is how a
centralized agent would select its action strategies in order to optimize the welfare cost (i.e.
the sum of two individual players’ cost).
We have shown in Theorem 3.1 that the control strategy is totally characterized by
Riccati equations for two-player setup. Similar analysis would show that same characteristics
for the control strategy are true for the centralized agent. However, it will have a single
Riccati equation as opposed to two equations that we have. Similarly, the gain of the
controller might change. Considering the symmetric case i.e. B1 = B2, Q1 = Q2, Q12 =
Q22 = Q11 = Q21 we can show that the control strategy for the centralized agent will
be equivalent to the strategies of the two agents (i.e. Lt =
[
L1t
L2t
]
), Therefore, for a fixed
switching strategy, the optimal welfare cost is the same for both, the game setup and the
centralized structure. However, the centralized switching strategy will be different from
game switching if λ1 6= λ2.
The above anomaly is seen since, in our model, the (selfish) players will not switch
unless the switching strictly reduces their own cost, even though the switch might reduce
the social welfare cost. However, the social welfare cost will always be minimized when we
give the switching control to a centralized entity with the cost-to-go at stage k being the
social welfare Vk = V1k + V2k . It is straightforward to notice V∗k ≤ V1∗k + V2∗k .
The centralized switching strategy is given by
C¯k(M, 0) + V∗k+1(AMA′ + S) > C¯k(M, 1) + V∗k+1(0) (43)
where C¯K(·, ·) = C¯1k(·, ·) + C¯2k(·, ·). An interesting study will be to characterize the social
loss lk = V1∗k + V2∗k − V∗k .
This is also known as price of anarchy and it will be studied elsewhere.
5 Simulation Results
We consider the following two-dimensional system to illustrate our analysis that has been
carried out in the preceding sections.
Xk+1 =
[
0.4 0.8
−0.8 1
]
Xk + U
1
k − U2k +Wk
where Xk, U
1
k , U
2
k ,Wk ∈ R2 for all k. Wk ∼ N (0, 0.25I). The observation cost parameters
λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 1.5.
For the cost (6), the following parameters are taken:
Q1 =
[
0.3 0
0 0.7
]
, Q2 =
[
0.8 0
0 0.2
]
, Q12 = Q21 = 0 and Q11 = Q22 = I.
One can show that Lit−1 = (−1)i−1P it (I+P 1t +P 2t )−1A. By denoting Pt = I+P 1t +P 2t ,
one can verify:
P it = Q
i +A′P−1t+1P
i
t+1(P
i
t+1 + 1)P
−1
t+1A
P iT = Q
i
We set the horizon of the game to be T = 15 and assume that X0 is known to the players
i.e. M0 = 0.
In Figure 2, we show the optimal switching strategy ∆∗k(≡ V 1∗k · V 2∗k ) in black dots. In
a game with horizon 15, the switch was closed for 5 times. In red line, we plot the value
Figure 2: The red and blue lines plot Vi∗k (M∗) w.r.t k for i = 1 and 2 respectively. M∗ is
the optimal trajectory of Mk for the optimal switching strategy (s
1∗, s2∗). The black dots
show the behavior of the optimal switching signal.
function V1∗k (M∗k ) along the optimal trajectory of Mk determined by (19) and the optimal
∆∗k. Similarly, in blue lines we plot V2∗k (M∗k ).
In Figure 3, we illustrate a comparative result for the cases when observation costs are
finite (λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1.5) and when observation costs are infinite (so that no observation is
practically acquired). In this figure we see that even with 5 observations (out of 15 possible),
there are more than 50% reductions in costs. The dotted curves in this figure also indicate
the envelop of Vi∗k . In other words, all the graphs of Vi∗k (M∗k ) obtained by varying the pair
(λ1, λ2) will remain below the dotted lines shown in Figure 3.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have considered a switched stochastic LQ game where the switching carries
a finite cost. We have characterized the SPE control and switching strategies for both the
players. The SPE control strategy turns out to be a linear strategy characterized by Riccati
equations which do not depend on the switching strategy. The quality of state estimation
depends on the switching strategy and hence the switching cost-to-go function depends on
the estimation error variance. We have shown that no-switch (open switch) is always a SPE.
However, at certain time instances coordinated switching is also a SPE. Moreover when both
no-switch and switch are SPE, then the cost-to-go with switching is lower than the same
with no-switching for both players. We studied a two-player game, however similar analysis
is easily carried out for a general n-player game.
Figure 3: A comparison among the costs for the cases when costly measurements are avail-
able (λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1.5) and no measurements are available (λ1 = λ2 =∞)
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The idea of the proof is based on backward induction. It should be noted that Xˆt satisfies
the Kalman-filter like equations except the fact that the measurements are only available
only through a switching and we always get noise free measurements whenever a switching
is done.
We define the filtered variable as Xˆt = E[Xt | I¯t] and the prediction variable as Xˆt+1|t =
E[Xt+1| It].
Xˆt|t−1 = AXˆt−1 +B1U1t−1 +B
2U2t−1 (44)
Therefore,
Xˆt = (1−∆t)Xˆt|t−1 + ∆tXt
where ∆t = V
1
t · V 2t .
Xˆt|t−1 satisfies the dynamics (11). In a compact form, one can check
Xˆt = AXˆt−1 +B1U1t−1 +B
2U2t−1 + ∆t(AEt−1 +Wt−1) (45)
where Et = Xt − Xˆt. Thus it satisfies the difference equation:
Et = (1−∆t)(AEt−1 +Wt−1) (46)
Therefore, we can write
Xˆt = Xˆt|t−1 + ∆t(AEt−1 +Wt−1) (47)
Let P it satisfy the following backward equation for i = 1, 2:
P it =Q
i + Lit
′QiiLit + L
j
t
′QijLjt + (A−BiLit −BjLjt )′P it+1(A−BiLit −BjLjt )
P iT =Q
i, (48)
and Lit satisfies the relation:(
Qii +Bi′P it
(
I −Bj(Qjj +Bj ′P jt Bj)−1Bj ′P jt
)
Bi
)
Lit−1
= Bi′P it (I −Bj(Qjj +Bj ′P jt Bj)−1Bj ′P jt )A (49)
Let us consider the cost segment for player i for the given switching strategy profile
(s1∗, s2∗):
Jik(g1, g2) =E
[ T∑
t=k
Cit(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t , V
1
t , V
2
t )| I¯k
]
=E
[ T∑
t=k
Cit(Xˆt, U
1
t , U
2
t , V
1
t , V
2
t ) + ‖Et‖2Qi | I¯k
]
=E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Xˆt‖2Qi + ‖U it‖2Qii + ‖U jt ‖2Qij ) + ‖XˆT ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
+
E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
(50)
Let us denote J1∗k = ming1 J1k(g1, g2∗) and g1∗ = arg ming1 J1k(g1, g2∗). Similarly we
define J2∗k and g2∗.
Claim 7.1 For all k,
Ji∗k = E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + ∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖
2
Qi | I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik (51)
where ∆T = 0.
proof This is proven by induction. It is easy to check that conditioned under I¯t, Et and
Xˆt are uncorrelated.
Hence E[‖Xt‖2Qi | I¯t] = E[‖Xˆt‖2Qi | I¯t] + E[‖Et‖2Qi | I¯t].
Therefore, at k = T , the above claim is true. At k = T − 1,
Ji∗T−1 = min
giT−1
E
[
‖XˆT−1‖2Qi + ‖U iT−1‖2Qii + ‖U jT−1‖2Qij+
‖XˆT ‖2Qi | I¯T−1
]
+ E
[
‖ET−1‖2Qi + λi∆T−1 + ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯T−1
]
(52)
Using XˆT = AXˆT−1 +B1U1T−1 +B
2U2T−2, we obtain
gi∗T−1 = −LiT−1XˆT−1
Consequently, the claim holds for k = T − 1.
Let us assume that the claim holds for some k + 1 ≤ T . Then,
Ji∗k =E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
+
min
gi
E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Xˆt‖2Qi + ‖U it‖2Qii + ‖U jt ‖2Qij ) + ‖XˆT ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
= min
gik
E
[
‖Xˆk‖2Qi + ‖U ik‖2Qii + ‖U jk‖2Qij + J i∗(k + 1)| I¯k
]
+ E
[
‖Ek‖2Qi + λi∆k| I¯k
]
(53)
We used that fact that I¯k ⊂ I¯k+1 and hence
E[E[X|Ik+1]|Ik] = E[X|Ik].
Therefore using the hypothesis that the claim holds for k + 1, we can write (53) as:
Ji∗k = min
gik
E
[
‖Xˆk‖2Qi + ‖U ik‖2Qii + ‖U jk‖2Qij + ‖Xˆk+1‖2P ik+1 | I¯k
]
+ E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
+ E
[ T−1∑
t=k+1
∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 | I¯k
]
(54)
Note that,
Xˆk+1 = AXˆk +B
1U1k +B
2U2k + ∆k+1(AEk +Wk)
and therefore,
E[‖Xˆk+1‖2P ik+1 | I¯k] = E[‖AXˆk +B
1U1k +B
2U2k‖2P ik+1 + ∆k+1‖(AEk +Wk)‖
2
P ik+1
| I¯k]
. As a result, we obtain,
Ji∗k = min
gik
E
[
‖Xˆk‖2Qi + ‖U ik‖2Qii + ‖U jk‖2Qij + ‖AXˆk +B1U1k +B2U2k‖2P ik+1 | I¯k
]
+ E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖2Qi | I¯k
]
+ E
[ T−1∑
t=k
∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 | I¯k
]
(55)
Note that Xˆt is I¯t measurable for all t. Thus, we can say from (55) that the optimal U
1
k
for player 1 should be given by:
U1k = −(Q11 +B1′P 1k+1B1)−1B1′P 1k+1(AXˆk +B2U2k ) (56)
Similarly, for player 2, it can be shown that the optimal U2k will be:
U2k = −(Q22 +B2′P 2k+1B2)−1B2′P 2k+1(AXˆk +B1U1k ) (57)
Comparing the expressions for optimal U ik and along with the definition of L
i
k matrices we
obtain (basically solving the two linear equations in U ik):
U ik = g
i∗
k (I¯k) = −LikXˆk (58)
Now substituting the optimal U ik in (55), and using the definition of P
i
k from (48) we
get:
Ji∗k = E
[ T−1∑
t=k
(‖Et‖2Qi + ∆t+1‖AEt +Wt‖2P it+1 + λi∆t) + ‖ET ‖
2
Qi | I¯k
]
+ ‖Xˆk‖2P ik
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